Are Corporate Takeovers In The Nation\u27s Interest? by Magenheim, Ellen B.
Swarthmore College 
Works 
Economics Faculty Works Economics 
Spring 1988 
Are Corporate Takeovers In The Nation's Interest? 
Ellen B. Magenheim 
Swarthmore College, emagenh1@swarthmore.edu 
This work is brought to you for free and open access by . It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty 
Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Let us know how access to these works benefits you 
 
Recommended Citation 
Ellen B. Magenheim. (1988). "Are Corporate Takeovers In The Nation's Interest?". Forum For Applied 
Research And Public Policy. Volume 3, Issue 1. 78-87. 
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-economics/379 
Forum for applied research and public policy / Tennessee Valley
Authority.
Knoxville, Tenn. : Tennessee Valley Authority, 1986-[2002]
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/msu.31293201587171
Public Domain, Google-digitized
http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google
We have determined this work to be in the public domain,
meaning that it is not subject to copyright. Users are
free to copy, use, and redistribute the work in part or
in whole. It is possible that current copyright holders,
heirs or the estate of the authors of individual portions
of the work, such as illustrations or photographs, assert
copyrights over these portions. Depending on the nature
of subsequent use that is made, additional rights may
need to be obtained independently of anything we can
address. The digital images and OCR of this work were
produced by Google, Inc. (indicated by a watermark
on each page in the PageTurner). Google requests that
the images and OCR not be re-hosted, redistributed
or used commercially. The images are provided for
educational, scholarly, non-commercial purposes.
ARE CORPORATE
TAKEOVERS IN THE
NATION’S INTEREST?
ELLEN MAGENHEIM
Ellen Magenheim is an assistant professor of economics at Swarthmore College.
conomists, lawyers, and investment bankers often predict the
recent high level of corporate mergers and acquisitions cannot
be sustained. Yet in the first half of 1987 alone, 2,056 takeovers
were announced totaling $106.3 billion.
Some of last year's largest takeovers included US AIR Group's purchase
of Piedmont Airlines, Inc. for $1.7 billion and Security Pacific Corporation's
buy out of Rainier Bancorp for $1.1 billion (the latter may have been the largest
bank merger in U.S. history)."
Despite recent tax law changes, insider trading scandals, anti-takeover
measures adopted by potential target companies, and regulatory restraints
imposed by wary state legislatures, the frenetic pace continues. Mergers and
acquisitions are not only a high stakes drama on Wall Street; they have become
a significant force in the U.S. economy.
Some claim corporate takeovers affect the economy positively—a belief
reflected in the following passage from the 1985 Economic Report of the
President:
The available evidence . . . is that mergers and acquisitions increase national wealth.
They improve efficiency, transfer scarce resources to higher valued uses, and stimulate
effective corporate management.”
A comprehensive evaluation of existing evidence, however, indicates these
assertions may be too sanguine. Takeovers may indeed have some positive
economic impacts, but they have some negative ones as well—inside and out
side the firm. Equally important, we simply do not have sufficient evidence
for a definitive conclusion. Corporate takeovers may increase the wealth of
some stockholders but decrease the wealth of others. They may improve
management efficiency or simply cause disruptions. They may strengthen the
financial standing of some but cripple other companies with debilitating debt.
And certainly, there are unanswered questions about a takeover's unsettling
impact on employees and communities.
Such uncertainties suggest a black and white analytical sketch of the impact
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of corporate mergers and acquisitions will not do. What we need is a full por
trait of their impact—one that conveys the various shades of meaning embodied
in this powerful economic trend. That evaluation will take time; but given the
extent to which mergers and acquisitions are reshaping the U.S. economy, it
is an exercise we cannot afford to neglect.
AT ISSUE
Questions regarding takeovers can be divided into four broad areas: (1)
What motivates a firm to make a takeover bid, and why do particular firms
become targets for acquisition? (2) What are the effects of takeovers on
stockholders in both the acquiring and acquired firms? (3) What are the ex
ternal effects of acquisition, especially on employees and local communities?
(4) How have state and federal policymakers responded to the increasing
importance of takeovers in the economy?
Why Takeovers Occur. There is much debate about why bidders pur
sue mergers and acquisitions. Supporters of the current wave of takeover ac
tivity, such as Professor Michael Jensen of the Harvard Business School and
Mesa Petroleum Chairman T. Boone Pickens, argue that corporate acquisi
tions, especially hostile takeovers, effectively discipline entrenched manage
ment and restore the competitive spirit of U.S. corporations.”
This view is based on two assumptions that can be tested empirically. First,
it suggests target companies perform poorly relative to other non-target firms
and especially to those firms seeking to acquire them. Second, it suggests target
companies will perform better after a takeover than they did before.
Research shows, however, target companies are at least as profitable as
other corporations and in many instances as profitable as the firms acquiring
them." For example, 15 target companies in large hostile takeovers that
occurred in 1982 and 1983 had provided their shareholders with an 18-percent
rate of return, well above the average rate of return for al
l corporations during
those years.
Evidence, then, does not support the hypothesis that economically inferior
corporations serve as targets for stronger, more aggressive competitors. This,
however, is only one theory as to why acquisitions occur. Others fall into two
general and somewhat contradictory categories: Acquiring firm managers are
motivated either b
y
the desire to increase shareholder welfare or b
y
a desire
to increase their own welfare, perhaps at the expense of shareholders.
For target firms, stockholders benefit regardless of the motivation behind
the acquisition. Shareholders in acquired firms walk away with premiums that
are on average 50 percent more than pre-bid share prices. In some cases shares
double in value. Such was the case when Greyhound acquired Verex and Johns
Manville acquired Olinkraft. This is an undeniable acquisition benefit.
For shareholders in acquiring firms, however, takeover announcements
may be cause for concern, not celebration.” Stockholder wealth in acquiring
firms may increase (or at least not decrease) following acquisition, as the firms
gain financial strength or perhaps even monopoly power in the marketplace.
If the acquisition is designed to enhance management (not shareholder) welfare,
Mergers and acquistions
are not only a high stakes
drama on Wall Street;
they have become a
significant force in the
U.S. economy.
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however, shareholders could find their shares declining in value. For exam
ple, if managers acquire a firm because their compensation is tied to asset
growth, or to gain “psychic” income, or to make their companies larger as
protection against a takeover, shareholders may suffer losses if the merger is
not a good one. In effect, although managers may benefit, the acquisition lowers
the market's expectation of the firm's future performance, which, in turn, causes
stock prices to fall."
Indeed, growing evidence shows shareholders in acquiring firms suffer
economic losses, especially in the long run, after an acquisition. Shareholders
in acquiring firms can expect a rate of return that is five percent to 16 percent
less than projected for one to three years after a takeover." The projection
is based on the acquiring firm's performance before the takeover.”
The reasons for these losses are not well understood. Possibly, the market
becomes wary of the substantial increases in debt often associated with
takeovers, or it loses confidence in the acquiring firm's ability to manage
effectively an acquired firm’s assets. Whatever the explanation, these losses
may translate into millions of lost dollars for shareholders in acquiring
companies.
Although takeovers may have a negative effect on shareholder wealth in
acquiring firms, comparing average losses to the average gains among
shareholders in acquired firms yields a positive dollar amount. (Estimated out
comes for specific companies, however, vary greatly.)” This suggests acquir
ing firm shareholders need to pay more attention to what managers are doing
with a company's equity. Are they reinvesting capital into the company? Are
they rewarding shareholders? Or are they making acquisitions that benefit
themselves at the expense of shareholders? In other words, are managers using
shareholder equity efficiently and productively?
The Effects of Rising Debt. A takeover's impact, however, is not limited
to shareholders. Given the significant role debt plays in takeover financing,
the effects on bondholders also must be considered. Acquisitions are often
financed with so-called junk bonds or higher grade bonds." After acquisi
tion, acquiring firms may be saddled with heavy debt. For example, for 56
firms that organized hostile takeovers between 1976 and 1983, the average
weighted debt-equity ratio rose from 52 percent in the year before the takeover
to 77 percent in the year after the takeover."
Bondholders in target firms, or even in potential targets, also may feel
the effects of takeover activity. One way to fight off unwanted takeover bids
is through recapitalization in which companies reduce equity and increase
debt—thus making themselves less attractive to would-be raiders. The most
dramatic example of recapitalization is Phillips Petroleum's reaction to separate
bids by Mesa Petroleum and Carl Icahn. To avoid takeover, Phillips added
$4.5 billion to its debt burden and reduced its equity base b
y
$5 billion. As
a result, it became the most highly leveraged company in the oi
l industry.”
Another defense against an unwanted takeover bid is “greenmail;” i.e.,
a target firm buys back a raider's shares at a substantial premium. Such
payments are often financed through borrowing. For example, to avoid takeover,
Safeway paid Dart Group $139 million in greenmail, and Gillette paid Ronald
Perelman's Revlon Group $34 million in greenmail.”
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As debt rises, bond ratings are often downgraded because of a company's
more precarious economic condition. In 1986, Standard and Poor's reassessed
ratings on 513 bond issues; 364 were downgraded. An additional 205 cor
porate credits were subject to review because of mergers.”
For stockholders, takeovers could mean greater profits or greater losses—
often depending on whether they have investments in the acquired or the acquir
ing firms. For bondholders, greater indebtedness could reduce the face value
of their investment. These two groups, however, are not the only ones affected
by a corporation's changing fortunes in a takeover, particularly when it comes
to the consequences of indebtedness.
What will heavily leveraged companies do during an economic downturn,
when they face difficulty in making fixed interest payments? One option is for
a debt-laden acquirer to retire some of the debt by selling divisions of the recent
ly acquired target. Other options include reducing investments, assuming even
more debt to finance the existing debt, or declaring bankruptcy. How such
actions may affect the company's future profitability is unclear.
For shareholders and the economy at large, these are not attractive options.
Consider the effects of widespread declarations of bankruptcy. Not only will
the bankrupt firm's debt-holders and equity-holders be affected, so too will
suppliers, customers, and companies that did business with the firm. In short,
if bankruptcy follows, the effects of takeovers are no longer restricted to
stockholders and bondholders, and the takeover issue is raised beyond a prob
lem of private corporate governance.
Changes in Investment Behavior. The tendency to increase debt as
a means to influence management's investment and operating decisions is
magnified by the growing importance of institutional investors in the stock
market. The increase in institutional ownership, some economists argue, is
associated with a growing emphasis on short-term performance, perhaps at
the expense of investments that pay off only in the long run.
As in other management decisions, the effect of emphasizing immediate
profitability at the expense of future returns is not limited to a firm's stockholders
and bondholders. Consider research and development (R&D) investments. In
the best of economic times, R&D investments are risky. If a company is heavily
indebted and fearful of takeover and-or of meeting substantial debt payments,
investment in a highly risky project is unlikely to be approved. Avoiding R&D
investments will not only be felt by the firm, through losses in future profitability,
but also by society. For example, successful R&D programs in the phar
maceutical industry translate into both higher corporate profits and increased
public welfare through more effective medicines.
Evidence to date shows no statistically significant changes in R&D invest
ments after takeovers.” What is not yet known, however, is whether changes
in the types of investments take place. For example, there could be a shift
toward less risky investments or toward investing abroad, either of which could
have important consequences for the nation's future economic welfare.
Employee and Local Community Effects. The effects of a takeover
on employees in target firms may be divided into two categories: absolute
changes in the number and location of employees and more subtle changes
Research shows...target
companies are at least as
profitable as other cor
porations and in many in
stances as profitable as
the firms acquiring them.
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in employee attitudes and productivity because of changes in the work en
vironment and uncertainty associated with corporate takeovers.
Direct evidence on either effect is hard to come by. However, much anec
dotal evidence culled from corporate takeover accounts suggests substantial
cuts in employment follow a takeover. For example, after the creation of Unisys
by the merging of Sperry and Burroughs, 9,000 jobs were eliminated. Unfor
tunately, insufficient systematic analysis of a takeover's absolute and distribu
tional effects on employment has been done; consequently, no general
conclusions can be drawn.
What is clear, however, is the complexity of the issue. How one sees the
employment impact is often determined by the analytical lens one uses. For
example, while the number of jobs in a particular location may fall, new employ-
ment opportunities in a company's headquarters located elsewhere may rise.
Thus employment opportunities may be redistributed. And, even if the absolute
number of jobs decreases, this may reflect more efficient use of a firm's
resources—an outcome that may eventually result in lower prices. Counter
balancing this positive effect are the economic and social costs of increasing
unemployment. For al
l
these reasons, reductions in the labor force or redistribu
tion of employment opportunities will be viewed differently from a local perspec
tive than from a national one.
A less ambiguous issue is the effect of takeovers on employee attitudes.
Acquisitions in general, but more so in hostile takeovers, may negatively affect
employee attitudes and performance because of rising uncertainty about future
employment and working conditions. Increasing employee turnover and fall
ing employee morale often follow a takeover. For example, when Diamond
Shamrock took over Natomas, 75 percent of Natomas's staff left with severance
pay; when Connecticut General merged with INA to form CIGNA, the CIGNA
work force fell b
y 4,200, with most employee losses coming from INA."
Because firms invest in employees through on-the-job training and because
employees develop firm-specific human capital, an increase in turnover may
indicate an inefficient use of human capital b
y
the firm.
Employees and others may also be affected b
y
local community changes.
This issue was important in the recent proposed takeover of Minnesota's largest
retailer, Dayton, Hudson Company, b
y
the Washington, D.C. based Dart Com
pany. Dayton, Hudson is noted for its high level of philanthropy. There was
great concern that if the company were owned by interests outside Minnesota,
civic funding would decline. Nonprofit organizations and communities that had
benefited from Dayton, Hudson's generosity to the arts and social services
feared diminished corporate commitment to community welfare."
STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS
The Williams Act in 1968 represented the first expression of concern among
policymakers over the impact of corporate takeovers on both private and public
interests. This statute (and its subsequent amendments) not only had impor
tant direct effects on takeovers, but also paved the way for passage of state
takeover statutes.
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The Williams Act stipulated an acquiring firm would have to meet specified
disclosure requirements and wait a certain amount of time before a takeover
could be finalized. The intent was to provide managers and shareholders in
a target firm sufficient time and information to fully evaluate a takeover bid.
This gave them protection from unexpected offers in which shareholders might
feel compelled to respond quickly. Taking time to evaluate an offer—in the
absence of mandated legislated delay—raised the risk of missing the oppor
tunity to tender at al
l
or of being in the second, lower-priced tier of a two-tier
offer.
“First generation” state takeover laws basically emulated the Williams Act,
although some contained stricter reporting requirements and longer waiting
periods. One striking effect of these laws has been the increased premiums
paid shareholders in acquired firms. A recent study estimates the Williams
Act raised average premiums from 32 percent in the pre-regulation period
to 53 percent in the nine years following its passage; state takeover laws have
added another 20 percent. The Williams Act and subsequent state takeover
laws also may be responsible for fewer takeover bids, perhaps because they
increase takeover costs."
Following the Williams Act, 36 states passed takeover statutes. Several
of these statutes were struck down by the courts. They were ruled to conflict
with the Williams Act (which intended to maintain neutrality between target
and bidding firm interests) and with the Constitution's commerce clause (which
granted Congress sole power to regulate interstate commerce). Such judicial
opinions might have deterred state legislatures from maintaining or enacting
new state takeover statutes. Takeover activity, however, changed significantly
in the 1980s, most notably in the growth of hostile takeover bids and in the
number and types of anti-takeover defenses, such as golden parachutes, poison
pills, and dual-class recapitalizations.” These changes brought forth a “second
generation” of takeover statutes, the characteristics of which may be illustrated
by examining Indiana's takeover legislation recently upheld b
y
the Supreme
Court.
The most controversial provision of the Indiana statute is granting certain
shareholders the right to decide if other shareholders may vote. “Disinterested”
shareholders, which typically excludes management and bidders, may vote
to restrict other shareholders from exercising their votes on a takeover bid.
Through this provision, raiders and managers can be prevented from voting
on a takeover bid, thereby leaving the decision to the other shareholders. The
Supreme Court upheld this highly controversial statute on the grounds
shareholder voting rights are an internal corporate matter traditionally governed
by state law. This ruling paved the way for other states to adopt similar anti
takeover regulations; since the Indiana ruling, 12 states have adopted anti
takeover legislation or modified existing legislation.”
A second aspect of the Indiana statute that touches on a central point in
the takeover debate is a required 50-day waiting period between the announce
ment of a takeover bid and its completion, which is 30 days longer than the
time required b
y
federal statute. Lengthening the delay raises two important
policy concerns: the statute's neutrality between competing corporate parties:
...if the effects of take
over are felt outside the
firm, public policy
becomes relevant.
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and the conflict between national and state interests. Such delays make it easier
for a target firm's management to launch an anti-takeover defense or to search
for a “white knight.” A longer waiting period is thus advantageous to a target
firm, a consequence that conflicts with the Williams Act's intent to keep the
arm of government neutral in takeover battles. Assessing this point requires
consideration of the second issue: the conflict between state and national inter
ests. Assume, although this contradicts some evidence cited above, takeovers
occur because they promote efficiency. From a national perspective, closing
plants or reducing the number of workers by eliminating overlapping func
tions reduces domestic production costs. However, for the community that
depends on one or two companies for jobs or charitable donations, a different
perspective takes hold.
This difference in federal and state perspectives is manifested most clearly
in Ohio's takeover statute. In evaluating takeover proposals, directors are
ordered to consider not only the interests of shareholders, which is the stan
dard responsibility of directors, but also the interests of employees, suppliers,
customers, and the local economy.” The combination of a longer delay period
and a broadened policy perspective emphasizes Ohio's desire to put state inter
ests in a primary position.
Although the most dramatic changes in takeover legislation have occurred
at the state level, the future is likely to bring changes in federal legislation
as well. Bills introduced in the first session of the 100th Congress addressed
issues related to both target and acquiring firms. The bills propose a longer
waiting period before a takeover is finalized. They also prohibited managers
in target firms from using greenmail, golden parachutes and other anti-takeover
devices without first receiving stockholder approval. The bills are intended
(1) to give managers and shareholders in target firms sufficient time to evaluate
offers and (2) to restrict managers from blocking a takeover bid at the expense
of the company's future financial health. Despite these trends, the final form
of state and federal legislation is not yet clear.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Takeovers have an internal effect on a firm's stockholders and bondholders
and an external effect on employees, communities, and the economy.
Effects purely internal to the firm do not alone demand a public policy
response. If only shareholders suffer financial losses resulting from acquisi
tions, one can argue that only internal corporate policies and-or corporate gov
ernance regulations should be changed. In that relatively simple situation, no
reasonable economic arguments exist to justify public intervention with regard
to takeovers.
However, if the effects of takeover are felt outside the firm, public policy
becomes relevant. If takeovers generate positive externalities, government might
want to subsidize takeovers to ensure an optimal number take place; this argu
ment is analogous to the one applied to public investments in socially beneficial
R&D efforts. Conversely, if takeovers generate negative externalities, controls
on their character or quantity should be developed.
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Despite evidence that acquiring firm shareholders often lose, research shows
the positive net economic effects of acquisitions. This indicates that, from the
perspective of the acquiring firms, corporations face a problem in the domain
of corporate governance. There may be internal company problems that allow
acquiring firm managers to pursue actions that do not serve shareholder inter
ests. From a nationwide perspective, this does not make takeovers a public
policy issue. Such findings suggest public intervention in corporate takeovers
may be justified only if a company is motivated by a desire to avoid taxes or
to attain monopoly power.
Analyzing the internal effects of takeover activity on corporate firms,
however, is only part of the story. If takeovers are shown to exert significant
external effects on workers, communities, R&D, and the macroeconomy, public
policy intervention may be justified.
Based on this evidence, two general conclusions can be drawn. With its
conflicting findings and unresolved issues, the evidence does not support the
assertion that takeovers increase national welfare. Further, it also suggests
takeovers are not al
l
the same and to make policies on that misperception could
be damaging to the economy.
The assumption underlying most analyses, although rarely stated explicitly,
is that takeovers are a homogeneous class of events. In fact, great variety exists—
e.g., acquisitions can be made as tender offers (in which the bidding firm's • ©
managers appeal directly to target firm stockholders) or as mergers (in which impacts of different types
a takeover bid is negotiated between the managers of the bidding and target
firms; moreover, they may be paid for with cash or by exchanging stocks).
The public and private effects of takeovers will undoubtedly vary with these
different characteristics. When considering the benefits and costs of takeovers
to society, policymakers must recognize the different impacts of different types
of takeovers.
This relationship needs to be better understood before appropriate options
can be developed. The policy most likely formulated will neither encourage
nor discourage al
l
takeovers but create an environment that nurtures publicly
and privately beneficial takeovers and inhibits those that are not beneficial.”
Before that policy is developed, many questions regarding the effects of dif
ferent types of takeovers must be answered.
When considering the
benefits and costs...
policymakers must
recognize the different
of takeovers.
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22. At the time this article went to press, it was still too early to assess the impact on takeover
activity of the historic 508-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average that took place
on October 19, 1987. In fact, it is possible that two conflicting trends will emerge from
the crash: (1) in some areas, takeover activity could increase as many companies become
takeover bargains available at a fraction of their pre-crash selling price; (2) in other areas,
takeover activity could decrease as companies use their resources to buy back their own,
now lower priced shares. Under the second scenario, there would be a decrease in the
number of outstanding shares for these firms, thus making a takeover more difficult.
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